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Tin men, rubber men, middle men: Chi-
nese entrepreneurs under British rule
The Chinese dominated tin-mining in 
Malaysia before Europeans introduced 
dredging technology in the early 20th 
century. Subsequently, Chinese mining 
companies lost out to European joint-
stock companies with more sophisticated 
technology and capital. Moreover, colonial 
government discrimination and interven-
tion favoured European companies over 
Chinese firms (Jomo 1988).
In the early 1900s Chinese entrepreneurs 
incorporated rubber-production into their 
established gambier and pepper economic 
networks. In the 1930s, following the devel-
opment of rubber plantations and trading 
and the inter-war expansion of manufac-
turing, they established banks to address 
the financial needs of Chinese business-
men (Tan 1953, Tan 1982). All early Chi-
nese banks were clan- and ethnic-based 
and possessed only limited amounts of 
capital.
Most Chinese manufacturing during the 
inter-war years consisted of raw material-
processing that required simple technol-
ogy to produce rubber sheets, foodstuffs 
such as breads, biscuits, sweets and bever-
ages, building materials and metal goods, 
and to process tin ore (Huff 1994). Chinese 
also monopolised rice mills in northern 
Malaya (Wu 2003), and, by 1955, owned an 
estimated 80-90% of the two minor sec-
tors of manufacturing and construction 
(Wheelwright 1963).
Manufacturing activity, however, was 
small-scale owing to the British policy of 
importing most manufactured goods and 
to Britain’s reluctance to promote large-
scale industry alone. After the war, between 
1947 and 1957, most Chinese manufactur-
ing remained in agriculture and commod-
ity-processing such as rubber-milling, 
rice-processing, pineapple-canning, tin-
smelting, and coconut oil- and palm oil-
refining. The Chinese also controlled the 
export-based timber industry (Puthucheary 
1979) and played the important role of ‘go-
between’, linking European importers to 
the rural and urban populace. Nonethe-
less, the British owned or controlled the 
economy’s major sectors. 
From miniscule to ‘manufactory’: inde-
pendence and Chinese business expan-
sion
With independence, the new govern-
ment adopted a laissez-faire economic 
system that aimed to encourage foreign 
direct investment (FDI). This helped cre-
ate many small and medium-scale enter-
prises (SMEs). The government’s greater 
national orientation in its development 
programmes, and the Malaysian Chinese 
Association’s (MCA) role in preventing 
excessive bureaucratic interference in 
private business, further enhanced the 
growth of Chinese businesses.
In the 1960s, Chinese participation in the 
manufacturing sector mostly remained 
small-scale and focused on food, plastic, 
rubber and wood-based industries. Most 
of these businessmen lacked the capital, 
technical know-how and managerial skills 
to compete with foreign interests. Moreo-
ver, with limited government incentives 
and support, Chinese companies remained 
small and were often dependent on for-
eign technology (Khor 1983:25). But their 
earlier success in rubber and tin allowed 
them to diversify in the financial sector, 
thereby spurring additional industrial and 
property development activities. Scores of 
banks were incorporated in the 1960s, all 
substantially controlled by Chinese with 
the exception of Bank Bumiputera (Hara 
1991, Tan 1982). In the absence of a strong 
Malay entrepreneurial class, Chinese con-
tractors and developers played the most 
significant role in the construction and 
property development of both private and 
state projects (Jesudason 1989, Lim 2004, 
Tan 2006).
Mostly small-scale, but a few Chinese con-
glomerates did emerge. For example, the 
Kouk Group used capital accumulated in 
rubber, sugar, rice, tin and trading to build 
large manufacturing plants, such as Malay-
sia’s first and largest sugar refinery, Malay-
an Sugar, mainly through partnership with 
foreign companies and the government. 
Loy Hean Heong, who accumulated his 
capital from speculating in rubber estates, 
ventured into manufacturing by acquiring 
a fledging carbide company, an adhesive 
tape and rubber band company and an 
aluminium foil lamination company (Jesu-
dason 1989). The Hong Leong group, 
originally from Singapore, also exerted a 
strong presence in the manufacturing of 
construction materials (Tan 1982). In 1968 
the late Loh Boon Siew, the sole distribu-
tor of Honda motorcycles and vehicles, 
established the first-ever fully Malaysian 
‘manufactory’ and launched production 
well before the country’s first industrial 
development push (Flower 2006). Mean-
while, the Tan family, who controlled the 
Tan Chong Group, the franchise-holder 
for Nissan vehicles in Malaysia and Singa-
pore since 1958, and the Chua family, who 
controlled the Cycle & Carriage Company, 
became aggressively involved in the auto-
mobile industry (Troii 1991). 
These large-scale Chinese manufactur-
ers acquired knowledge and technology 
in related businesses by partnering with 
foreign companies, while the majority of 
Chinese entrepreneurs were small, family-
based, possessed minimal capital and had 
limited access to sophisticated technology. 
That said, overall Chinese involvement in 
the economy clearly showed a notable 
shift from primary production to manu-
facturing.
Malaysian policy, Chinese response: the 
makings of the Ali-Baba alliance
Following the racial riots of 13 May 1969, 
the Malaysian government implemented 
the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971-
1990) ‘to reduce and eventually eliminate 
the identification of race with economic 
function’. Its ultimate goals were ‘the 
emergence of a full-fledge Malay entrepre-
neurial community within one generation’ 
and increasing Bumiputera ownership of 
the corporate sector to 30% by 1990. In 
accordance with this affirmative action 
policy, ethnic quotas were introduced. 
Consequently, Bumiputeras were favoured 
in the awarding of government contracts, 
tender, loans and credit.
One of the controversial NEP regulations 
was the 1975 Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA). Firms with more than RM100,000 
in shareholder funds and more than 25 
employees were required to employ a 
workforce that was 30% Malay and to 
reserve 30% of their equity for Malay inter-
ests. The ICA had its greatest effect on 
SME family-based businesses, but large 
companies were not spared. The Chinese 
business community responded in five dif-
ferent ways.
First, they shifted investment from the 
manufacturing sector to commerce, 
finance, construction, property develop-
ment and other sectors that could gen-
erate quick returns and were not subject 
to the ICA (Jesudason 1989; Hara 1991; 
Yasuda 1991). Second, large companies 
relocated their headquarters and shifted 
most of their capital abroad, resulting in 
‘capital flight’. Third, those who stayed in 
Malaysia changed their business strategy 
to accommodate NEP requirements by 
incorporating influential Bumiputeras and 
integrating Bumiputera capital into their 
family-owned businesses (Gomez 1999, 
Searle 1999). Fourth, scores of companies 
maintained their paid-up capital just below 
the limit that required a company to offer 
30% of its equity to Bumiputera sharehold-
ers.
Finally, Chinese businessmen maintained 
their economic position by forming ‘Ali-
Baba’ alliances. ‘Ali’, or the Malay partner, 
was the less active or ‘sleeping partner’, 
contributing his political influence and 
connections. ‘Baba’, or the Chinese part-
ner, was the more active half of the alli-
ance, contributing his capital, skills and 
technical know-how. This kind of partner-
ship gave Chinese access to licenses and 
lucrative government contracts reserved 
for Bumiputeras, especially in the construc-
tion and transportation sectors (Nonini 
1983). In the wholesale and retail sector, 
Chinese entrepreneurs demonstrated 
their business network power and control 
by boycotting Bumiputera attempts (with 
government support) to cut off Chinese 
wholesales and retail access to the fruit 
market (Kuo 1991).
Equal partnership: ‘new wealth’ and the 
indispensable Bumiputera ‘technopre-
neur’
Thus we can identify three types of Chi-
nese wealth. ‘Old wealth’ includes busi-
nesses that developed into conglomerates 
before the NEP. ‘New wealth’ emerged in 
the 1990s after businesses successfully 
conformed to the NEP. ‘Declining wealth’ 
refers to those business groups that lacked 
entrepreneurial drive when the second or 
third generations took over and did not try, 
or failed, to adapt successfully to the NEP, 
and as a result either stagnated or declined 
(Heng and Sieh 2000).
At the corporate level, the new NEP-Malay 
capitalist class is closely integrated with 
Chinese ‘new wealth’ in various joint ven-
tures. Consequently, in the 1990s, the con-
cept of interdependence and the practice 
of complementing each other developed at 
the elite level. This new inter-ethnic corpo-
rate culture marks an important structural 
shift from Chinese family-based organi-
sations to Sino-Bumiputera alliances 
(Gomez 2003, Searle 1999, Heng and Sieh 
2000, Wazir 2000).
When the NEP officially came to an end 
in 1990, the National Development Plan 
(NDP, 1991-2000) was implemented to 
pursue the NEP’s ‘unachieved objectives’, 
one of which was to advance the forma-
tion of the ‘Bumiputera Commercial and 
Industrial Community’ (BCIC), a Malay 
or Bumiputera entrepreneurial class. The 
NDP aimed to transfer entrepreneurial 
skills to Bumiputeras at the micro-level by 
encouraging joint ventures between them 
and non-Bumiputera or foreign investors. 
Bumiputera ‘technopreneurs’ would then 
become active in technology-based indus-
try (Malaysia 2000). Scores of formal 
Sino-Bumiputera partnerships material-
ised in the late 1990s. These new ‘strate-
gic’ partnerships, officially endorsed as 
‘genuine’ joint ventures, signaled a major 
evolution in Sino-Bumiputera partner-
ships, occurring in industries such as tin-
mining (Badhrol 1999), food-catering and 
shoe manufacturing (Rugayah 1994) and 
combine rice-harvesting (Rutten 2003). 
Partnerships shifted from construction to 
manufacturing and resulted in significant 
Bumiputera acquisition of technology, 
knowledge and skills. Knowledgeable and 
capable Bumiputeras created more value 
for their companies in technology-based 
industries, showing that government 
policies influenced both Chinese and 
Bumiputera business culture (Chin 2004, 
2006).
Following the emergence of a capitalist 
and new Malay middle class (Abdul Rah-
man 2002), Chinese entrepreneurs began 
to see Bumiputera participation as crucial 
to enhancing business development, espe-
cially to placing the company on the fast 
track to public listing (Sin Chew Jit Poh 5 
November 1995). The changes within these 
two ethnic societies, and high economic 
growth, gave birth to the Sino-Bumiputera 
‘equal’ partnership. As a result, Chinese 
entrepreneurship has become more plural 
in the post-NEP and post-NDP era. Even 
though exclusive or intra-ethnic practices 
persist, Chinese business culture in Malay-
sia is gradually breaking away from intra-
ethnic partnerships.
Adapting to new challenges in the global 
economy  
The economic liberalisation that began in 
1986 signifies a gradual lifting of ICA regu-
lations. Since 1990, SMEs are no longer 
subject to the ICA stipulation of Bumi-
putera equity participation. This change 
indirectly encouraged Chinese-dominant 
SMEs to expand in terms of production 
scale and revenue. Thus Chinese entre-
preneurs not only adjusted to Malaysia’s 
changing environment but also to global 
capitalism, weathering the 1997 financial 
crisis through state assistance and their 
own responses (Chin 2003). Although the 
crisis is over, advances in science and tech-
nology and the liberalisation of trade under 
the Asian Free Trade Area and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) regimes present new 
challenges, particularly to SMEs, which 
have yet to prove capable of withstanding 
global market demands and technologi-
cal change. In this advanced technologi-
cal age, Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs 
continue to draw on their own resources 
– cultural values, acquired knowledge, 
accumulated experiences, skills and social 
network – to remain globally competitive. 
Their success has varied, but their adapta-
tion, like the change that makes it neces-
sary, has been constant for a century.
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